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THE REBIRTH OF THE SUPREME
COURT OF MEXICO: AN APPRAISAL
OF PRESIDENT ZEDILLO'S
JUDICIAL REFORM OF 1995
Jorge A. Vargas'
INTRODUCTION
Only one month after taldng office, President Ernesto Zedillo Ponce
de Leon made one of the most surprising changes in the legislative
history of Mexico. President Zedillo initiated a constitutional amendment
which profoundly altered the structure and function of Mexico's federal
judicial system. Exercising the power granted by article 94, paragraph I,
of the Constitution (Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos
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Mexicanos),' President Zedillo submitted a legislative bill to the Senate
proposing to amend twenty-seven articles of the Constitution.2
Among other unprecedented changes,3 President Zedillo transformed
the composition, structure, and function of Mexico's Supreme Court of
Justice. The amendments reduced the number of Supreme Court Justices
from twenty-six to eleven, and established stricter qualifications for
nominations.4 In addition to changing the manner in which the Justices
are appointed, their tenure was limited to fifteen years.5 With the inten-
tion of creating a truly constitutional court, President Zedillo modified
the original jurisdiction of this highest tribunal.6 He also created a new
judicial organ, the Council of the Federal Judiciary (Consejo de la
Judicatura Federal) designed to relieve the Supreme Court of its bur-
densome and time-consuming administrative duties! This new organ
appears to have been inspired by similar modem judicial structures
operating in Europe and Latin America.' Moreover, responding to a
1. CONST. art. 94, para. I (conferring upon the President of the Repub-
lic-jointly with the members of the House of Representatives and the Senators of
the Federal Congress of the Union, and the State legislatures--"the right to initiate
laws or decrees").
2. See Diario Oficial de ]a Federacion [D.O.], Dec. 31, 1994, at 2-9 (amending
27 articles of Mexico's 1917 Constitution, effective on January 1, 1995); see Jorge A.
Vargas, The Supreme Court of Mexico: Recent Changes in Its Composition and Func-
tions (forthcoming) (providing a detailed legal and historical analysis of these consti-
tutional changes). The author verifies the accuracy of the Spanish language cites and
all English translations.
3. Other constitutional changes included the following: the Attorney General's
Office (Procuraduria General de la Repdblica), the functions of federal and state
prosecutors (Agentes del Ministerio Pdiblico), some procedural aspects of the Writ of
Amparo (Juicio de Amparo), and the adoption of measures leading towards the es-
tablishment of a National System of Public Security (Sistema Nacional de Seguridad
Pblica). Iniciativa de Presidencial de Reformas al Poderes Justicial y la
Administracion de Justicia Constitucional, Presidencia de la Republica, Palacio
Nacional, Mexico, Dec. 5, 1995 [hereinafter Iniciativa] (on file with the author). This
article does not address any of these changes.
4. CONST. arts 94, 95, and 96.
5. Id. art. 94.
6. Id. art. 105.
7. Id. art. 100; see also infra notes 119-31 and the accompanying text (ad-
dressing the composition, functions, and administrative structure of the Council of the
Federal Judiciary in detail).
8. Similar Judicial Councils currently exist, for example, in France, Spain, and
Italy. Their work appears to have influenced the recent emergence of similar organs
in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Colombia, El
Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay and Perdi. See Hector Fix Zamudio, Jurisdici6n
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national demand for a competent, professional, and honest system of jus-
tice, President Zedillo created a federal judiciary comprised of ten ad-
ministrative categories, ranging from Circuit magistrates and District
judges to court secretaries and "Actuarios."9 In accordance with the
guidelines and directives formulated by the Plenary of the Council of
the Federal Judiciary, this branch of the government will be adminis-
tered and regulated by the Institute of the Judiciary (Instiuto de la
Judicatura).'
In order to restructure the Supreme Court, President Zedillo, made an
unprecedented decision, and persuaded the twenty-six existing Supreme
Court Justices to retire early. As a result, during the first twenty-six
days of 1995, while the Senate examined the candidates nominated by
the new executive, Mexico had no Supreme Court. 2
Constitucional y Proteccidn de los Derechos Fundamentales en America Latina, in
Ai~o XI, CoNTREBucioNEs, No. 2, at 84 (1994).
9. Under Mexican law, Actuarios are officers of federal or state courts who
have been legally empowered to conduct certain judicial acts, in particular., personally
serving summons to defendants or witnesses; implementing writs of attachment and
writing the corresponding minute in the judicial file; and keeping a formal record
which details their activities. Like Notary Publics (Notarios Pdblicos), Actuarios are
empowered with public faith (i.e., investidos de fJ priblica) in relation with any offi-
cial act they conduct in the exercise of their functions. Th'e attributions and obliga-
tions of Actuarios are regulated by the respective Organic Act of the Judicial Power
(Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial) of each of the 31 States that compose the Repub-
lic of Mexico. See LEYBS Y REGLAMENTOS DE BAJA CALIFORNIA 178-79 (Filiberto
CArdenas Velasco ed., 1992).
10. See infra notes 167-75 and the accompanying text (explaining that the New
Institute of the Judiciary is an auxiliary organ of the Federal Judiciary council).
11. See D.O., Dec. 31, 1994, at 9 [Article Segundo Transitorio] (providing that
the current Justices "shall conclude their functions at the entry into force" of said
decree, namely January 1, 1995). The 26 justices received a pension equal to a
"forced retirement" pursuant to a special decree establishing the grounds for "[florced
or voluntary retirement (Retiro forzoso o voluntario) of the Supreme Court Justices."
Ild.
12. The Senate did not approve the 11 justices of the numerically more compact
Supreme Court of Justice until January 26, 1995. The new justices took their official
oath the following day. The new Justices are: 1) Jos6 Vicente Aguinaco Alemn, 2)
Mariano Azuela (repeated), 3) Juan Diaz Romero (repeated), 4) Genaro David
G6ngora Pimentel, 5) Juventino Castro Castro, 6) Olga Maria del Carmen Sdnchez
Cordero, 7) Juan Nepomuceno Silva Meza, 8) Humberto Romdn Palacios, 9) Sergio
Salvador Aguirre Anguiano, 10) Jos6 de Jesfis Gudifio Pelayo, and 11) Guillermo
Iberio Ortiz Mayagoitia. Ernesto Zedillo Ponce de Leon, Mexico's State of the Nation
Address (Sept 1, 1995) (transcript available in LEXIS, CURNWS file).
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In order to implement these constitutional changes legally, several
federal statutes and codes had to be amended, most notably the Organic
Act of the Federal Judicial Power (Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial de
la Federaci6n or L.O.P.J.F.).13
Most specialists in the Mexican judiciary anticipated this profound
reform. First, drastic changes in Mexico's judicial system, at the federal
and state levels, had long been expected as the indispensable comple-
ment to Mexico's recent policies in favor of unimpeded international
trade, a strong drive towards privatization, a smaller and more efficient
bureaucracy, and the fostering of foreign investment. 4 Without a pro-
fessional, legally efficient, modem, and honest system of justice, Mexico
cannot expect any political and economic modernization or similarly,
any increase in the flow of foreign investment.'5
Second, making changes to the Supreme Court of Justice is but a
recurring exercise in Mexico. Important changes have been made to this
high court in the past, especially during the administrations of Presidents
Calles in 1928; Cdrdenas in 1934 and 1940; Alemfn in 1951; Diaz
Ordaz in 1968; and De la Madrid, as recently as 1987.6 In general,
most of these structural and procedural changes attempted to alleviate
the Supreme Court of its very heavy docket, as well as to endow the
high tribunal with the power of a true constitutional court.'7 These
changes follow the spirit that caused the United States Congress to alter
the structure and functions of the United States Supreme Court in the
early stages of its evolution. 8
13. See Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial de ]a Federaci6n (L.O.P.J.F.), in D.O.,
May 26, 1995, at 2 (illustrating the text of the Act). This Mexican statute not only
parallels but appears to have been inspired originally by the United States 1789 Judi-
ciary Act.
14. See Jorge A. Vargas, Mexico's Foreign Investment Act of 1993, 16 LoY. L.A.
INT'L & COMP. L.J. 101 (1994) (listing Mexico's 1993 policy changes affecting trade,
privatization, bureaucracy, and foreign investment, and predicting strong judicial re-
forms to support those changes).
15. Id.
16. See FELIPE TENA RAMhuz, LEYES FUNDAMErrALES DE MEXICO 1808-1991, at
881-1058 (S.A. Porrdia ed., 1991) [hereinafter LEYES] (documenting constitutional
changes); see also DERECHOS DEL PUEBLO MEXICANO, MEXICO A TRAVES DE SUS
CONsTrUCIoNEs, XLVI Legislatura de la Cdniara de Diputados, Vol. VII (1967)
[hereinafter DERECHOS] (detailing constitutional reform initiatives which have fortified
the judicial power).
17. See H6ctor Fix Zamudio, Setenta y Cinco Aflos de Evoluci6n del Poder Judi-
cial de Mixico [Seventy Five Years of Evolution of the Judicial Power of Mexico],
in OBRA JURIDICA MEXICANA 651 (2d ed. 1987).
18. See the Judiciary Act of 1789, Ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) and its subsequent
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Finally, in 1994, during President Zedillo's visit to Guadalajara City,
as the candidate of the official party, Partido Revolucionario
Institucional (PRI), President Zedillo proposed this reform. In advancing
ten proposals for the creation of a new system of security and justice,
the then presidential candidate strongly advocated for a comprehensive
reform of the judicial power.9 This reform embraced the need to have
more independent judges, quality in the administration of justice, and
guaranteed access for all Mexicans to the justice system.
President Zedillo summarized the proposed changes in the legislative
initiative which he submitted to the Senate to amend the Constitution:
The purpose of this initiative is to strengthen the Constitution and its
legality as the basic foundations for a safe, ordained and tranquil social
life. The strengthening of the Judicial Power, and [the corresponding]
alterations to its internal organization and functions, and the jurisdiction of
those institutions in charge of [public] security and the administration of
justice, are proposed herein... These changes entail an important step in
the development of our democratic rdgime, strengthening the Judicial
Power to accomplish a better balance among the Federal Powers, thus
creating the bases for a system of administration of justice and public
security that responds in a better way to the determination of all Mexi-
cans to live in a nation of law and order.?
For President Zedillo, these constitutional modifications, as profound
and unprecedented as they may be, signal only the beginning of future
reform.2 These changes are likely to continue to touch not only upon
the federal judicial system but, more importantly, to establish a more
democratic balance between the three branches of the government in
Mexico, which would open the door for Mexico to enter into a new era
of true political democracy and a new kind of federalism.'
amendments, especially in 1869, 1875 and 1887 (demonstrating the early evolution of
the United States Supreme Court).
19. See ERNEsTo ZEDa.LO, LAS POLrrCAS DE BIENSAR (1994); see also
Seguridad y Justicia, at 102-21, Guadalajara, Jal., July 14, 1994.
20. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 2-3.
21. Once the Senate and the House of Representatives approved President
Zedillo's bill by a two-thirds vote, the constitutional amendments in question were
approved by a simple majority of the State legislatures. The entire process was ac-
complished in less than one month. See CONST. art. 135 (establishing the proce-
dure-patterned after the United States Constitution, Article V-for amending the Con-
stitution).
22. See generally Iniciativa, supra note 3.
1996] 299
AM. U. J. INTL L. & POL'Y
This article is divided into four parts. Part I addresses the new com-
position and functions of Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice. Part H
analyzes "Unconstitutionality Actions" (Acciones de
inconstitucionalidad). In what may constitute one of the most dramatic
changes to its original jurisdiction, the new second paragraph of article
105 of the Mexican Constitution empowers the Supreme Court to decide
the constitutionality of federal and state laws, as well as international
treaties, when petitioned by a legislative minority.' Part III explores
the role, composition, and functions of the Federal Judiciary Council,
the most recently added organ to the Federal Judicial Power. A brief
reference will be made here to the manner in which the Institute of the
Judiciary (Instituto de la Judicatura) is structuring and managing the
development, preparation, and training of the members of this organ.
Part IV will offer some ideas on the impact these changes may have. In
particular, it will examine how the work of the Supreme Court will im-
pact the lives of Mexicans and the legal future of the country.
I. THE NEW COMPOSITION AND FUNCTIONS
OF THE SUPREME COURT
Mexico's federal judicial system is ostensibly patterned after Article
III of the United States Constitution.24 During the formation of the first
federal constitution in 1824,' Mexico adopted a dual system of federal
and state courts, presided over by one Supreme Court of Justice. 6 This
system has been repeated in subsequent constitutions, in particular the
Federal Constitution of 1857,27 and more recently, the Constitution of
1917,' which President Zedillo sought to amend.
According to the Organic Act of the Federal Judicial Power (Ley
Organica del Poder Judicial Federal), as amended in 1995, judicial
power is exercised by: 1) the Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation
23. CONST. art. 105.
24. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 16, at 651.
25. CONST. (1824).
26. Id. art. 123 (providing that the federal judicial power shall reside in one Su-
preme Court of Justice, in the circuit courts and in the district courts). Article 138
added, "[a] law shall determine the manner and form in which the Supreme Court of
Justice is to take cognizance of the cases included in this Section." Id. art. 138; see
LEYES, supra note 15, at 186, 189.
27. CONST. art. 90 (1857).
28. CONST. arts. 94-107 (1917) reprinted in Fix Zamudio, supra note 16, at 856-
65 (referring to the federal judicial power).
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(Suprema Corte de Justicia),' 2) circuit collegiate courts, 3) circuit
unitary courts, 4) district courts, 5) the Council of the Federal Judiciary,
6) the federal jury of citizens (Jurado federal de ciudadanos), and
7) the courts in the states and in the Federal District (Mexico City) in
the cases provided by article 107, paragraph II, of the Constitution.0
Except for the newly added Council of the Federal Judiciary, the system
remains identical to the one under the preceding Organic Act of 1988.'
This enumeration does not take into account the existence of a large
(and growing) number of specialized courts-such as the administrative,
agrarian, electoral, fiscal and labor courts-that are placed not as a part
of the Federal Judicial Power, but rather, under the Federal Executive'
These courts are outside the jurisdiction of the new Council of the Fed-
eral Judiciary?3 In Mexico, the general opinion is that these Executive-
aligned tribunals clearly contravene the principle of separation of pow-
ers, enshrined in article 49 of the Mexican Constitution.'
A. THE COMPOSITION OF THE SUPREME COURT
AND THE APPOINTMENT OF JUSTICES
In his legislative bill, President Zedillo prefaced the changes to the
Supreme Court by recognizing that this is "the judicial organ which has
functioned with the most efficiency and credibility [in Mexico]."
Therefore, any change to be made to Mexico's system of justice must
start with its highest tribunal.' Prior to the amendment, the Mexican
Supreme Court was composed of twenty-six Justices2l and functioned
29. The official name of Mexico's Supreme Court is the Suprema Corte de
Justicia de la Naci6n. See ALBERTO TRUEBA URBINA & JORGE TRUEBA BARRERA,
NUEVA LEGISLACION DE AMPARO REFORMADA 180 (S.A. Porrua ed., 1993) [herein-
after LEGisLACaoN].
30. L.O.PJ.F. art. 1 (1995), in D.O., May 26, 1995, at 2.
31. L.O.P.J.F. art. 1, in D.O., Jan. 5, 1988 (as amended in 1988); see
LEG sLACION, supra note 28, at 179.
32. LEGISLACION, supra note 28.
33. Id.
34. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 1-11.
35. Id. at 1-4.
36. Id. at 5.
37. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 16, at 3. Five of these Justices, known as
"Supernumerarios," are not members of the Supreme Court plenary, but rather formed
a part of the Auxiliary Chamber (Sala Auxiliar).
1996]
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either as a full Court (Pleno), or divided into sections composed of five
Justices 3 (Salas).39
Article 94 of the Constitution, as amended, reduced the number of
Justices from twenty-six to eleven,' the number originally established
by the Constitutions of 1824 and 1917.' This reduction generated an
intense debate,42 focusing on whether this relatively small number of
Justices would be able to handle the usually heavy caseload in a prompt
and effective manner. The comparably small number of magistrates that
occupy judicial posts in similar constitutional courts in other countries
convinced the Mexican Congress and the State legislatures to proceed
with this change.43
Unlike the Constitution of the United States, which provides for "one
Supreme Court" but does not designate its size, the Mexican Constitu-
tion explicitly enumerates not only the specific number of Justices,
known as Ministers (Ministros), but also the original and appellate juris-
diction of the Court.' The Constitution also mandates other minute
details which may have been more appropriately placed in secondary
38. See L.O.PJ.F., in D.O., May 26, 1995 (regulating, in great detail, the com-
position and function of the Court; its jurisdiction (in Pleno or in Salas); powers and
obligations of its President (Presidente de la Suprema Corte)-the equivalent of the
Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court; calendar of activities; licenses and
retirements; and so forth).
39. CONST. art. 94.
40. L.O.P.J.F. art. 2.
41. CONST. art. 124 (1824) (providing that the Supreme Court (Corte Suprema de
Justicia) was to consist of 11 justices (Ministros), distributed among three Salas and
one Prosecutor (Fisca)). The general Congress was authorized to increase or decrease
the number of Justices, as it considered convenient. See LEYES, supra note 15, at
186.
42. See MARio MELGAR ADALiD, REFORmAS AL PODER JUDICIAL (UNAM, 1995)
[hereinafter REFORMAS] (providing a detailed academic analysis of aspects of this
constitutional amendment). The proposed changes generated widespread discussion and
controversy throughout the nation, especially within political, legal, and academic
circles.
43. See Hector Fix Fierro, Reformas y Adiciones a la Constituci6n Federal en
Materia de Administraci6n de Justicia (1995) (unpublished paper, on file with the au-
thor) [hereinafter Reformas y Adiciones] (indicating the low number of Justices on the
high courts of other nations: nine in France, 16 in Germany, 12 in Spain, 15 in Italy,
14 in Austria, 13 in Portugal, and nine in the United States).
44. See Acta Constitutiva de ]a Federaci6n Mexicana (Constitutional Act of the
Mexican Federation), in D.O., Jan. 31, 1824 (serving as a guide to the Constitutional
Congress that formulated the first Federal Constitution of Mexico in 1824).
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statutes.' Such details include, for example: qualifications for judicial
appointment, method of selection, official oath, temporary absences,
resignations, licenses, and so forth.'
Similar to what has happened with the evolution of the United States
Supreme Court, where the number of Justices has been modified seven
times (from the original six in 1789 to the present number of nine in
1869),4' the composition of the Mexican Supreme Court has also grown
in a gradual manner. The Federal Constitution of 1824 established the
initial number of eleven, and ultimately a constitutional amendment to
article 94, made by President Miguel Alemdn in 1951 (known as the
"Alemn Reform"), ' resulted in the most recent number of twenty-six.
The Court will continue to function both in Pleno, and in two Salas,
each composed of five Justices. Every year, the Court shall have two
sessions: the first, from January until mid-July, and the second, from
August until mid-December.49 As provided by the 1995 Organic Act of
the Federal Judicial Power, these sessions shall be open to the public,
except when "morals or public interest dictate otherwise." '
Decisions of the Supreme Court, when acting as a full court, are to
be unanimous or by a majority vote (except in two special cages provid-
ed by paragraphs I and II of article 105 of the Constitution).' Justices
may abstain from voting only "when there is a legal impediment or
when they did not attend the discussion of the case." 2 In the event of
a tie, the matter shall be resolved in the subsequent session. If the Jus-
tices cannot break the tie at this session, then they shall discard the
draft decision (Proyecto) and the President of the Supreme Court is to
45. See CONST. arts. 94-101 (devoting an article to each of these details).
46. Id.
47. In 1789, the United States Congress established the number of Justices at six.
In 1801, this number changed to five, and then, in 1807, to seven. In 1837, there
were nine justices and in 1863, there were 10. In 1866, the number changed back to
seven and then increased to nine in 1869. See Judiciary Act of 1789, 1 Stat. 73
(1789) (amended 1869, 1875 and 1887).
48. LEYES, supra note 15, at 881-1058; see Ingrid Brena Sesma, Un "Radical"
Proyecto de Reformas al Poder Judicial, in REFORMAs, supra note 41, at 37-44.
49. L.O.P.J.F. art. 3.
50. CONsT. art. 94; see L.O.P.J.F. art. 6 (providing that the Court's sessions in
Pleno "shall be, as a general rule, public; and private when the Plena so deter-
mines"). The Court's plenary sessions addressing "the autonomy of the organs of the
Federal Judicial Power, and the independence of its members, shall be private."
L.O.P.J.F. art. 6.
51. L.O.P.J.F. art. 7.
52. CONST. art. 7.
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appoint a new Justice who, taking into account the opinions already ad-
vanced, is to produce a new draft decision." If the tie continues, the
President is empowered to break it with a quality vote (voto de
calidad).54
Nominations and appointments of Supreme Court Justices are regulat-
ed by article 96 of the Constitution. Unlike the United States Constitu-
tion, which leaves many questions open to interpretation regarding the
federal judicial power, Mexico's fundamental law, as suggested earlier,
is very detailed, more closely resembling the United States Judiciary
Act."
Prior to the amendment, article 96 of the Constitution provided that
these "nominations are to be made by the President of the Republic and
submitted for the approval of the Senate (Cdmara de Senadores), which
either grants or denies approval within thirty days." 6 The new version
provides that the President shall submit the names of three candidates
(Terna) for approval to the Senate. Once the Senate examines the candi-
dates, it designates the Justice to fill the vacancy. Rather than selecting
the candidate by simple majority, as the old text demanded, the Senate
now must approve the candidate by a two-thirds majority vote.57
As opposed to the American system of submitting one nomination for
the Supreme Court,58 the federal executive proposes the names of three
candidates for Senate approval to fill a Supreme Court vacancy.59 In
Mexico, this system is thought to increase the likelihood that the chosen
candidate will be independent-both politically and judicially detached
from the Executive. If the Senate fails to approve a candidate within the
new requisite term of thirty days, article 96 provides that "the vacancy
shall be filled by the person who, out of the three proposed, is designat-
ed by the President of the Republic."
In order to occupy a seat in the Supreme Court, a potential Justice
must comply with the requirements enumerated in article 95 of the
53. L.O.P.J.F. art. 7
54. Id.
55. See Judiciary Act, ch. 20, 1 Stat. 73 (1789) (setting up the basic structure of
the United States judicial system). Article 96 of the Mexican Constitution, like the
Judiciary Act, contains a detailed outline of the structure and jurisdiction of a multi-
tiered federal court system.
56. See LEYES, supra note 15, at 623 (containing the old text of article 96).
57. CONST. art. 96.
58. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
59. CONST. art. 96.
60. See LEYES, supra note 15, at 623 (reprinting former art. 96).
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Constitution,6' which require that the candidate be: inter alia, a Mexi-
can citizen by birth; a citizen in good standing, whose civil and political
rights have not been restricted for any reason ("in full exercise of
his/her political and civil rights"); "have an attorney's degree"; and have
a good reputation (buena reputacidn). Justices must not have been "con-
victed of any crime which carries a maximum jail term of one year in
prison." This is excepted to, however, if the crime at issue "seriously
injures the good reputation (buena fama) in the public's eye."'
President Zedillo indicated in his legislative bill, that he was going to
"establish more demanding requirements and impediments" to becom-
ing a Supreme Court Justice. Modifying the requirements would ensure
that the nominee has sufficient professional capability and judicial expe-
rience for full discharge of a Justice's duties.
Although the requirements remained fundamentally the same, the
principal changes included: precluding those who, during the preceding
year, had served in certain important political posts;' a recommenda-
tion to give preference to persons who had served with distinction as
judges or legal practitioners;' a requirement that candidates must have
resided in Mexico "during the last two years prior to the nomination."
The original residence requirement was five years,' and in his bill,
President Zedillo proposed to reduce it to only one year.'
Another significant change merits some consideration, namely that the
tenure of Supreme Court Justices is now limited to a maximum of fif-
teen years. Prior to the change, article 94 of the Constitution, provided
that the Justices could only be "deprived of their posts" when im-
peached, in accordance with the procedure established by the Constitu-
61. CONST. art. 95.
62. See id. art. 95 (containing the complete text).
63. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 7. No definitions are provided for these terms.
64. CONsT. art. 95, para. VI. These political posts are: 1) Member of the Presi-
dential cabinet (Secretario de Estado); 2) Head of an administrative department, such
as PEMEX, 3) Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador General de la
Reptblica); 4) Attorney General of the Federal District (Procurador General del
D.F.); 5) Senator, 6) Federal representative (Diputado federaO; 7) Governor of any
State; and 8) Head of the Department of the Federal District (Jefe del Departamento
del D.F.). Id
65. For the exact text of the new paragraph added by the Zedillo amendment,
see CONST. art. 95.
66. See LEYES, supra note 15, at 623 (quoting former art. 95, para. V).
67. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 10.
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tion," or when they reach the age of compulsory retirement (seventy
years).
According to President Zedillo, this change will result in a Supreme
Court that is current and up-to-date with Mexico's social trends, and
able to legitimize its judicial function on a periodic basis:
If our Supreme Court is to become a true constitutional court, it must be
kept up to date to guarantee that its constitutional interpretation is in
harmony with the cultural, social and economic conditions at the time
when this interpretation is to be applied.'
A new paragraph added to article 101 of the Constitution provides
that Supreme Court Justices, as well as other magistrates and judges,
"may not act as patrons, attorneys, or agents in any proceedings before
the organs of the Federal Judicial Power, within the two years following
the date of their retirement."70
This same article requires "Justices, magistrates, judges (including
their secretaries), and members of the new Council of the Federal Judi-
ciary not to hold employment or office" at the federal or state level, in
the Federal District (Mexico City), or of a private nature, during their
judicial tenure, and imposes sanctions, such as losing the judicial post,
on those who violate this provision.7' The only exception is for the
positions performed "with no remuneration, in scientific, educational,
literary or charitable associations."'
This restriction that members of the federal judiciary, during their
tenure, not have sources of income other than their remuneration-a
restriction long imposed on Supreme Court Justices-contrasts the situa-
tion enjoyed by United States judges, magistrates and Justices. United
States federal judges, including those on the Supreme Court, can sup-
plement their salaries 73 with additional sources of income. It is known,
68. CONST. art. 94 (providing the responsibilities of public officials and ad-
dressing the issue of political impeachment); LEYES, supra note 15, at 623 (providing
former art. 94).
69. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 7.
70. CONST. art. 101.
71. CONST. art. 101 (1917). This provision originally appeared in the Constitu-
tional Draft formulated by Venustiano Carranza in 1916, which was later approved
and included in the original text, as article 101 of the 1917 Constitution. The tenor
of this prohibition dates back to the Seven Constitutional Laws (Las Siete Leyes) of
1836. See DERECHOS, supra note 15, at 860-63 (discussing restrictions on employment
for federal officials).
72. CONST. art. 101.
73. It has been reported that, in 1991, the Associate Justices received salaries of
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for instance, that United States Supreme Court Justices supplement their
salaries by honoraria for teaching and speeches."
A special proviso in article 94 establishes that salaries of Supreme
Court Justices, as well as Circuit magistrates, District judges and Coun-
selors (Consejeros) of the Council of the Federal Judiciary, may not be
reduced during their tenure.7 This proviso, taken directly from the
United States Constitution,76 resulted from a 1928 amendment to the
1917 Mexican Constitution. 7
One final issue regarding the Mexican Senate warrants consider-
ation.' This constitutional amendment was also designed, at least in
part, to give more power to the Senate, vis-a-vis the President of the
Republic. Rather than continuing with the old political governmental
structure, comprised of a most powerful Executive that systematically
overshadowed the legislature and judiciary, this change, which was the
result of President Zedillo's new political philosophy, was intended to
equalize the power among the three federal branches
As opposed to the pre-Amendment system of simply approving the
single nomination made by the President of the Republic, to fill a va-
cancy at the Mexican Supreme Court of Justice, the Senate now has
more leverage and independence to choose among the three candidates
nominated by the President. Unlike the United States-where the Senate,
either through a negative vote or through a refusal to act, has failed to
confirm twenty-six of the President's nominations to the Supreme
Court--only once, in 1944, did the Mexican Senate reject two nomi-
$153,600 and the Chief Justice $160,600. LAwREmcE BAUM, THE SUPREME CouRT 13
(1992).
74. See id. (reporting that in 1990 Associate Justice Antonin Scalia received
$47,000 for 12 speaking engagements).
75. CONST. art. 94.
76. U.S. CONST. art mH, § 1.
77. See D.O., Aug. 20, 1928 (relating that this was the frst amendment to article
94); DERECHOS, supra note 15, at 706 (providing the text of this amendment).
78. In Mexico, 128 senators comprise the Senate (Cdmara de Senadores), includ-
ing four for each of the 31 States, and four for the Federal District (Mexico City).
Out of each four senators, three are elected by a direct majority vote and the remain-
ing one is assigned to the political party that had obtained the largest majority.
CoNsT. art. 56 (1917); see also CONST. arts. 76, 49, 66 (enumerating the Senate's ex-
clusive powers).
79. See Josd Trinidad Lanz Cdrdenas, Las Nuevas Facultades del Senado de la
Repfiblica y el Poder Judicial, in RE IAS, supra note 41, at 47-55 (discussing
President Zedillo's movement towards political reform and openness).
80. See BAUM, supra note 72, at 47 (stating that these 26 instances of unap-
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nations submitted to it by President Gral Manuel Avila Camacho. Even
in that case, however, the Senate decided to approve the two nomina-
tions in question, when President Avila Camacho, rather than proposing
other candidates, decided to re-submit the same ones."'
The unbroken consistency demonstrated by the Senate in approving
all of the nominations for Supreme Court Justices has led one academic
to conclude that the Senate's role in this area had been one of a rubber
stamp. With this constitutional change, the Senate will hopefully have
a pivotal role in the appointment of future Justices (Ministros) of
Mexico's Supreme Court. Before the constitutional amendments, the
Mexican Senate engaged in a relatively simple and unobstructed process
of approving Supreme Court Justice nominees. The change in the politi-
cal landscape is expected to transform the Senate's role in the nomina-
tion process, from a mere constitutional or political formality into a
detailed public examination, designed to probe into the ability and pro-
fessional qualifications of the nominees. Future discussions on these
candidates shall address questions not only of the political affiliations
and professional experience of the candidates, but also of their: 1) geo-
graphical origin, 2) age, 3) sex, 4) prior judicial service, 5) social class,
and even 6) religion or ethnic origin. This exercise will resemble the
United States Senate nomination process for a United States Supreme
Court Justice."
If these changes occur, future Justices of Mexico's Supreme Court
will come not only from Mexico City (as has been customary), but also
from various other states, and the Supreme Court will gradually achieve
a proportional and balanced geographical representation. Additionally,
future nominees, rather than having long political careers, will be select-
ed from magistrates who have had long and brilliant judicial careers.
Moreover, rather than having a Supreme Court consisting solely of
proved nominees constitute approximately 20% of all nominations considered by the
United States Senate).
81. See Lanz Cdrdenas, supra note 78 (describing the resubmission of Supreme
Court Justices, Te6filo Olea y Leyva and Fernando de la Fuente).
82. See Lanz Cdrdenas, supra note 78, at 54 (expressing this sentiment in Span-
ish: "[Sie fortalece al Senado, en cuanto a que ya no serfi un simple
ratificador . . . " (Strengthening the Senate, such that it shall no longer simply be a
"rubber-stamp") (emphasis in original)).
83. See STEPHEN L. WASBY, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIAL
SYsTEM 86-136 (4th ed. 1993) (describing the nomination process); see also Paul E.
Freund, Essays on the Supreme Court Appointment Process, 101 HARv. L. REV. 1146
(1988) (discussing the role and process of senatorial advice and consent).
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"Mestizo" or "Criollo"' Mexican Justices, future Justices will proudly
come from some of Mexico's indigenous groups.
B. THE JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF JUSTICE
Unlike the United States Constitution,' Mexico's fundamental law
specifically enumerates not only the original and appellate jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court, but also provides in great detail" the jurisdiction
of the circuit and district courts. Thus, the chapter of Mexico's 1917
Constitution relative to the Federal Judicial Power is comprised of four-
teen articles.'
Historically, this part of the Constitution has evolved gradually, be-
coming lengthier, more technical, and increasingly complex. This evolu-
tion is evident when comparing the current federal judicial system with
the skeletal system established by the Federal Constitutions of 1824 and
1857, which laid down its legal contours and created its political foun-
dation.' Identifiable causes of this growth include: 1) the increasing
frequency with which the "Juicio de Amparo"'' has been, and contin-
ues to be, used to restore the infringement of constitutional rights by
public authorities; 2) the incessant quest for a better and more efficient
84. A "mestizo" or "criollo" is a person of mixed ethnic descent.
85. U.S. CONST. art. I0, § 1.
86. CONST. arts. 103, 107.
87. CONST. arts. 94-107.
88. See CONST. arts. 123-44 (1824); CONST. arts. 90-102 (1857); LEYES, supra
note 15, at 186-90, 622-24.
89. Juicio de Amparo is a federal suit filed in a federal court by an individual,
whether a Mexican national or a foreigner, who alleges that hisfher constitutional
rights--known in Mexico as "Individual Guarantees" (Garantlas individuales), enumer-
ated in Articles 1-29 of the Mexican Constitution-have been violated by Mexican
authorities at the federal, state or local levels. Articles 103 and 107 of the Mexican
Constitution, in conjunction with Articles 14 and 16 of the same Constitution, provide
the legal basis for this peculiar type of suit. Amparo suits are governed by a federal
statute known as the Federal Amparo Act (Ley de Amparo, Reglamentaria de los
Articulos 103 y 107 de la Constituci6n Politica). The crux of the Amparo suit is to
enjoin the authorities, both federal and state, from continuing to inflict acts in viola-
tion of the victim's constitutional rights.
Juicio de Amparo is a rather peculiar Mexican legal institution. For the sub-
stantive and procedural aspects of this unique Mexican suit, see IGNACIO BURGOA, EL
Juicio DE AMPARo (S.A. Porrda ed., 15th ed. 1987) (providing an excellent analysis
of the origin, content, and evolution of this unique legal institution). See also Hector
Fix Zamudio, A Brief Introduction to the Mexican Writ of Amparo, 9 CAL W. INT'L
LJ. 306 (1979) (containing an introductory analysis and overview).
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system of justice;' 3) the legitimate desire to transform the Supreme
Court into a truly constitutional tribunal;9 and 4) the undisputed, rapid
societal growth of Mexico over the last five decades, with varied and
challenging consequences.' Specifically, a paragraph in article 94 of
the Constitution provides that:
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court, its functioning as a whole (Pleno)
or in sections (Salas); the jurisdiction of the Circuit courts and of the
District courts, and the responsibilities incurred by the public servants of
the Federal Judicial Power, shall be governed by what is provided by the
laws in accordance with the bases established by this Constitution."'
Pursuant to its legal tradition, certain articles of the Mexican Consti-
tution, the content of which have special historic, economic, cultural, or
social significance, are expanded and developed into full-fledged statutes,
and are officially known as "Ley Reglamentaria.' In the federal judi-
cial area, the following statutes merit special attention:
1) the Organic Act of the Federal Judicial Power;95
2) the Federal Amparo Act, derived from articles 103 and 107 of the
Constitution;" and
90. See ZEDILLO, supra note 19, at 113-18.
91. Hector Fix Zamudio, La Suprema Corte de Justicia como Tribunal
Constitucional, in LAS NUEVAS BASES CONsTrrucIONALES Y LEGALES DEL SISTEMA
JUDICIAL MEXICANO, LA REFORMA JUDICIAL 1986-1987, at 345-90 (S.A. Porrua ed,,
1987).
92. See PLAN NACIONAL DE DEsARROLLO (NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT PLAN),
1994-2000, in D.O., May 31, 1995 [hereinafter PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO]
(discussing generally the basis for judicial reform in Mexico).
93. CONST. art. 94.
94. For example, the following constitutional articles have generated a correspond-
ing federal statute: 1) article 123, which regulates labor questions, generated the Fed-
eral Labor Act (Ley Federal del Trabajo); 2) article 27, addressing oil, agrarian lands
and other natural resources, led to the creation of the Federal Petroleum Act (Ley
Reglamentaria del Petrdleo) and the Federal Agrarian Act (Ley Federal Agraria);
3) article 3, establishing the public education system, led to the Federal Education
Act (Ley Federal de Educaci6n).
95. See generally L.O.P.J.F.
96. Ley de Amparo Reglamentaria de los Articulos 103 y 107 de la Constituci6n
Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, in D.O., Jan. 10, 1936. This highly
technical statute is composed of 234 articles. See Leyes Reglamentarias del Amparo,
LEGISLACION, supra note 28, at 475-89 (containing a brief history of the origin and
evolution of this statute, which was first enacted in 1852).
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3) the Reglamentary Act of the First and Second Paragraphs of article
105 of the Constitution,' recently enacted by President Zedillo as a
result of the constitutional amendments.
Article 949 provides the constitutional basis for the responsibilities
of public servants, and articles 108 through 114 enumerate these re-
sponsibilities. The political impeachment process delineated in articles
108 through 114,"°° and article 110 of the 1917 Constitution, governs
any questions arising out of these powers. Prior to the Amendment,
article 103 of Mexico's fundamental law, patterned after the United
States Constitution,' provided that federal courts had jurisdiction to
resolve: 1) "controversies"'" arising out of "laws or acts by the au-
thority that violate constitutional rights," known in Mexico as
"[i]ndividual guarantees" (Garantias individuales);0 3 2) laws or acts of
the federal authority that encroach upon or restrict the autonomy of the
States; and 3) laws or acts of State authorities invading the sphere of
federal jurisdiction.'
Article 104 added to federal jurisdiction: 1) maritime law controver-
sies; 2) controversies in which the Federation is a party; 3) controversies
between two or more States, or one State and the Federation, or those
between the Federal District (Mexico City) courts and those of the Fed-
eration or of a State; and 4) cases affecting members of the diplomatic
or consular corps. 5 The old text of Article 105 enumerated six "con-
97. Ley Reglamentaria de las Fracciones I y II del Artfculo 105 de la
Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos, in D.O., May 11, 1995, at 3
[hereinafter Ley Reglamentaria]. This new statute consists of 73 articles.
98. CONST. art. 94
99. CONST. arts. 108-14.
100. CONST. art. 110 (enumerating the public servants who are subject to political
impeachment). In the federal judicial area, the following are listed: 1) Supreme Court
Justices, 2) Counselors of the Federal Judiciary Council, 3) the Attorney General of
the Republic, 4) the Attorney General of the Federal District, 5) Magistrates of Cir-
cuit courts, and 6) District judges. Id.
101. U.S. CONST. art. ll, § 2.
102. Contrary to United States Constitutional Law, no legal distinction between
"controversies" and "cases" exists in the Mexican legal system, and these terms may
be used interchangeably. Mexico's Constitution, however, utilizes the term "controver-
sies" more frequently. CONST. arts. 103-05, 107.
103. CONST. arts. 1-29 (1917); see IGNACIO BURGOA, LAS GARANTIAS
INDIVMUALEs (S.A. Porrua ed., 1992) (indicating that Mexico's transformation is af-
fected by constitutional reform with institutional renewal).
104. CONST. art. 103.
105. Id. art. 104, paras. II-V.
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troversies" subject to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of
Justice: 1) between two or more States; 2) between one or more State
and the Federal District (Mexico City); 3) between the powers of the
same State; 4) between governmental organs of the Federal District on
the constitutionality of their acts; 5) "conflicts" between the Federation
and one or more States; and 6) "controversies" in which the Federation
is a party, in the cases established by the law."° The most notable
change of the recent amendment is in the jurisdiction of the Mexican
Supreme Court. The amendments contained in the second paragraph of
article 105, relative to the so-called "unconstitutionality actions"
(Acciones de Inconstitucionalidad) are particularly important. The
amendments provided a successful challenge to a federal, state, or mu-
nicipal law initiated by a qualified legislative minority, may result not
only in the abrogation of the statute in question (or the affected part of
it), but also in a Supreme Court decision. For the first time in Mexico's
history, the country will experience the same legal effects as are felt in
the United States when the United States Supreme Court declares a
statute unconstitutional.
II. ACTIONS OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY
Known as "amparo contra leyes,"'' the legal action challenging the
constitutionality of a federal or state statute, or an international treaty,
plays an important part in Mexico's legal system. In 1936, the Ley de
Amparo (Federal Amparo Act) created this legal mechanism,' 8 which
empowered the Pleno and Salas of the Supreme Court to review
Amparo decisions challenging the constitutionality of a "norm of a gen-
eral character" (i.e., a law or statute) or establishing "a direct interpreta-
tion" of a constitutional precept.'" These cases, however, were subject
to two limitations. First, only the aggrieved individual had standing to
106. Id. art. 105.
107. Domingo Garcia Belatinde, La Accidn de Inconstitucionalidad en el Derecho
Comparado, XLII REVISTA DE LA FACULTAD Da DERECHO DE MExico 61-75 (1992);
see Jesfis A. Arroyo Moreno, La F6rmula de Otero y el Amparo Contra Leyes, 20
JURIDICA 499 (1990-91) (discussing in depth the functioning of el Amparo Contra
Leyes).
108. See LEGISLACION, supra note 28, at 480-81 (stating that officially the Federal
Amparo Act is known as Ley Organica de los Articulos 103 y 107 de la
Constitucion Federal [Organic Act of Articles 103 and 107 of the Federal Act] pro-
mulgated by President Zoro Cardenas and published in D.O., Jan. 10, 1936).
109. LEGISLACION, supra note 28, at 298.
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challenge the constitutionality of the law in question. Second, the legal
effects of the Supreme Court judgment applied to no one but the ag-
grieved person."'
President Zedillo characterized the changes introduced in the new
second paragraph of article 105". of the Constitution "as one of the
most important innovations that [has] taken place in [Mexico's] legal
order throughout its long history.""' 2 Without eliminating the legal fea-
tures of the "Otero Formulation," (which will continue to apply in ordi-
nary cases of Amparo), this constitutional change enables qualified mi-
norities of legislative bodies at the federal, state, and municipal lev-
110. See BURGOA, supra note 88, at 121 (explaining that the Otero formula is a
typical feature of Amparo proceedings which limits the effects of the federal judgment
solely to the aggrieved party).
111. The amendment provides:
Art. 105: The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation shall take cog-
nizance, in accordance with the terms provided by the corresponding law (Ley
Reglamentaria), of the following matters:
II. Of actions of unconstitutionality whose object is to pose the possible
contradiction between a norm of a general character and this Constitution, with
the exception of those referring to electoral matters.
The actions of unconstitutionality may be filed, within thirty natural days
following the date of the publication of the norm, by:.
a) The equivalent of thirty-three percent of the members of the Chamber
of Deputies (Cdmara de Diputados) of the Federal Congress, against federal
laws or those of the Federal District (Mexico City) promulgated by the Federal
Congress;
b) The equivalent of thirty-three percent of the members of the Senate
(Cdmara de Senadores), against federal laws or those of the Federal District
promulgated by the Federal Congress, or of international treaties entered into by
the Mexican State;
c) The Attorney General of the Republic, against laws of a federal, state
or Federal District character, as well as international treaties entered into by the
Mexican State;
d) The equivalent of thirty-three percent of the members of some of the
State legislative organs, against laws promulgated by said organ; and
e) The equivalent of thirty-three percent of the members of the Assembly
of Representatives of the Federal District, against laws promulgated by said
Assembly.
The resolutions of the Supreme Court of Justice may only declare the invalidity
of the challenged norms, as long as they receive a majority of at least eight
votes.
CONsT. art. 105, para. I.
112. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 12.
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els-including the Attorney General of the Republic (Procurador Gener-
al de la Repablica) and the Assembly of Representatives of the Federal
District-to challenge the constitutionality of federal and state laws, and
international treaties, by filing an "Action of Unconstitutionality" directly
to the Supreme Court. Although the rationale behind this change has
generally effected positive and progressive development, the tenor of this
amendment has been unable to resolve a number of serious criticisms.
One criticism of the new amendment is that to exclude electoral laws
from these types of challenges is simply "incongruent." This critique is
rooted in President Zedillo's failure to fulfill his pledge to the principle
of constitutional supremacy."3 A strong critic of this change, Professor
Elisur Arteaga Nava, has asserted that in recent years, Mexican Constitu-
tional Law has precluded the Supreme Court, whenever possible, from
deciding electoral questions. This author adds that in Mexico today
"there is no competent organ to declare federal electoral laws unconstitu-
tional."' '
4
No legal justification exists for excluding electoral laws from this
kind of legal action. Although Mexico has created a Federal Electoral
Court (Tribunal Federal Electoral), with specialized jurisdiction over
electoral questions, this court, examines and renders an opinion only on
the legality of the elections, not on the constitutionality of the electoral
laws. These legal questions should clearly fall within the jurisdiction of
the Supreme Court of Justice in its new role as a constitutional court.
Some suggest that this constitutional change has been influenced by
current forms in certain European countries, such as Austria, France,
Spain, and Germany."' In these countries, a qualified number of mem-
bers of the legislative bodies, which generally form a part of the politi-
cal opposition, have the right to challenge the constitutionality of laws
before federal courts or other established organs of constitutional control.
This new phenomenon has been described as the "Judicialization of
Politics"-a manner of solving political conflicts through legal ave-
nues."
6
113. See Reformas y Adiciones, supra note 42, at 8 (stating that, "[t]his is incon-
gruent . . .because it not only permits the existence of a body of laws exempt from
constitutional control, but also because it leaves unfinished the recent evolution to-
wards the 'judicialization' of electoral matters").
114. See Elisur Arteaga Nava, Las Nuevas Facultades de la Suprema Corte de
Justicia de la Nacion, in REFORMAS, supra note 41, at 74, 94-95 (asserting that Mex-
ico lacks a check on its federal electoral laws).
115. Reformas y Addiciones, supra note 42, at 7.
116. See Torbjorn Valliner, The Judicialization of Politics, A World-wide Phenome-
314 [VOL. 11:2
SUPREME COURT OF MEXICO
This change may pose a double problem. On the one hand, legislative
minorities may attempt to convert their parliamentary defeats into court
victories indiscriminately. On the other hand, constitutional courts may
exceed their legal boundaries and become "substitute legislators.'..
Obtaining the requisite equivalent of thirty-three percent poses another
problem. Given the current composition of most of the legislative bod-
ies, which are still controlled by the official political party, Partido
Revolucionario Institucional (PRI), gaining the requisite thirty-three
percent minority may be highly unlikely. Professor Arteaga Nava sug-
gests that an easier and less risky solution may be for the minority to
submit and approve "a legislative bill proposing to abrogate or invali-
date" the statute in question."'
The right of the Attorney General to file these unconstitutionality
actions appears to transform this high official, at least in principle, to
the "guardian of the constitutionality of the laws of the nation." As long
as the majority in the Federal Congress coincides with the political party
of the Federal Executive (i.e., the PRI), "[it is improbable that the At-
torney General can exercise this right."".9 Finally, the difficulty in ob-
taining the required "majority of at least eight out of eleven votes," or a
"superqualified majority (seventy-three percent)""' of Supreme Court
Justices, for a "declaration of invalidity" adds to the unlikeliness of
judicial intervention.
What happens if six or seven of the Supreme Court Justices declare a
given statute or an international treaty invalid? According to one theory,
interpreting article 105, paragraph HI, a contrario sensu, the "declaration
of invalidity" is not going to have a binding effect. That is, in spite of
the opinion of the legislative minority who challenged the constitutional-
ity of said law or treaty, and despite the vote of the six or seven Su-
preme Court Justices who concurred with that minority, the challenged
statute, or treaty, will continue to be effective and legally enforceable
throughout Mexico.'
Given the delicate nature of these questions, the Federal Executive
decided to address, and hopefully clarify and resolve, the legalities asso-
non, 15 INT'L POL. ScimNcE REV. 91 (1994) (discussing how judicial facilities have
asserted a role in politics).
117. Reformas y Addiciones, supra note 42, at 7.
118. Arteaga Nava, supra note 113, at 99.
119. Reformas y Adiciones, supra note 42, at 8.
120. ld. at 9.
121. See Arteaga Nava, supra note 113, at 99-100.
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ciated with these new actions of unconstitutionality through the special
enactment of a specific Ley Reglamentaria.' Article 72 of this statute
provides that if the declaration of invalidity "is not approved by at least
eight votes . . . the Pleno of the Supreme Court shall dismiss the action
and order the matter to be sent to the archives."'
Prior to Zedillo's amendment, paragraph I of article 105 enumerated,
in general terms, six types of controversies over which the Supreme
Court of Justice had original jurisdiction. 24 Several of these controver-
sies parallel those enumerated in Article III, section 2 of the United
States Constitution." During most of this century, an intense govern-
mental centralism has prevailed in Mexico. This phenomenon directly
results from the virtual monopoly exercised throughout that country's
political arena by its official party: PRI, who until recently, maintained
complete control, eliminating any real opposition from other parties.'
Thus, because the government's official party transformed Mexico into
an undemocratic political system, most of these controversies did not
reach the Supreme Court. In the words of a Mexican scholar, the con-
troversies enumerated in article 105 of the Constitution were never tried
before the Supreme Court, making article 105 "practically inopera-
tive." 7
This assertion should be considered within the context of a country,
whose most important government officials at the federal, state and
municipal levels, are all members of the PRI. These officials include the
President of the Republic; the members of his Cabinet; all federal judg-
es, including the totality of the Supreme Court Justices (numbering
twenty-six, prior to the reform); state governors; virtually all members of
the Senate and of the House of Representatives; the members of the
122. See Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 96 (stating that this federal statute regu-
lates the time period within which these actions must be filed; information to be
provided in the initial motion; procedural aspects; judgments and so forth).
123. Id. art. 72.
124. See supra note 108 and accompanying text (listing the controversies subject
to the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of Justice).
125. See LEYES, supra note 15, at 188, 623 (explaining that article 137, para-
graphs I and IV, of Mexico's Federal Constitution of 1824 and the corresponding
articles in the Federal Constitution of 1857, followed the text of the United States
Constitution even more closely).
126. In recent years, other political parties have begun to gain some electoral
victories. For example, currently, out of 31 States, only the following four have gov-
ernors of National Action Party (Partido Accin Nacional or PAN): 1) Baja Califor-
nia, 2) Chihuahua, 3) Guanajuato, and 4) Jalisco.
127. Reformas y Adiciones, supra note 42, at 9.
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diplomatic and consular corps, including the administrative personnel;
and the municipal mayors in the overwhelming majority of the munici-
palities throughout that nation. These public servants are not only mem-
bers of the PRI but, in accordance with Mexico's political tradition, all
display the greatest deference for the opinions of the Federal Executive,
the highest political leader of the PRI. Therefore, rather than take to the
Supreme Court any of the controversies enumerated in article 105 of the
Constitution, the customary and politically correct means of resolution is
either directly by the President of the Republic or by the person who
the President may designate to solve the problem-generally the Secre-
tary of the Interior (Secretario de Gobernacidn) or the President of the
PRI. Professor Arteaga Nava has observed that while "these controver-
sies do take place in reality, no competent judicial authority exists to
resolve them."'" Professor Arteaga Nava reasons that the state superior
courts are not likely to be impartial, and suggests that the resolution of
these disputes should lie within the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
However, the intervention of the Supreme Court in these kinds of article
105 cases seems to be, in his opinion, out of proportion."
The detailed enumeration in the current text of article 10523 of
128. Arteaga Nava, supra note 113, at 94.
129. Id. at 94. Professor Arteaga Nava anticipates that the passage of time will
prove that these types of controversies are to be resolved by "other types of [federall
courts." I-
130. The Supreme Court of Justice of the Nation shall take cognizance, in accor-
dance with the terms provided by the corresponding law (Ley Reglamentaria), of the
following matters:
L Of constitutional controversies which, with the exception of those relative to
electoral matters, arise between:
a) The Federation and a State of the Federal District;
b) The Federation and a municipality;
c) The Executive Power and the Federal Congress; said Power and any of the
chambers of this Congress; or, in its case, the Permanent Commission
(Comisin Permanente), either as federal organs or as Federal District organs;
d) One State and another State;
e) A State and the Federal District;
f) The Federal District and a municipality;
g) Two municipalities of different States;
h) Two powers of the same State, on the constitutionality of their acts or gen-
eral provisions (disposiciones generales);
i) A State and one of its municipalities, on the constitutionality of their acts or
general provisions;
j) A State and a municipality of another State, on the constitutionality of their
acts or general provisions;
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these conflicts has no precedent in the constitutional history of Mexi-
co.' Its rationale may be the incipient change which is beginning to
take place in the political landscape of that country. Over the last de-
cade, Mexicans have pushed their country toward a most necessary and
profound political reform. In general terms, this reform seems to be
directed at two fundamental objectives. First, Mexicans favor an authen-
tic democratic interplay in the political arena, rather than a political
monopoly controlled by the PRI. The Mexican society is truly interested
in pluri-partidism and in the introduction of a clean and fair political
exercise. Mexicans are showing signs that they are interested in con-
structing a nation where genuine democracy is a reality.
Second, Mexicans are determined to take back the exaggerated power
which has long been in the hands of the Federal government. This pow-
er has created a politically unbalanced nation-a country which has been
subject to authoritarian centralism. Mexicans now demand a new type of
federal executive-one that keeps a balanced relationship with the other
two branches of government. At the same time, those same Mexicans
demand a new kind of federalism which has a more fair and balanced
interaction between the federal government and the States.
This desire for electoral reform, in recent years, has led to some
electoral triumphs at the municipal and gubernatorial level, by some
political parties, such as Partido de Acci6n Nacional (PAN) and Partido
Revolucionario Democrdtico (PRD). In addition, because some constitu-
tional changes have transformed the political representation in the Feder-
al Congress, minority parties have accomplished a larger numerical
presence in both the House of Representatives and the Senate. These
innovations suggest the emergence of:
k) Two organs of government of the Federal District, on the constitutionality of
their acts or general provisions.
As long as the controversies deal with general provisions of the States or of
the municipalities contested by the Federation, of the municipalities contested by
the States, or in the cases referred to in paras. c), h) and k) above, and the
resolution of the Supreme Court of Justice declares them invalid, said resolu-
tions shall have general effects when approved by a majority of at least eight
votes.
In the remaining cases, the resolutions of the Supreme Court of Justice shall
have effects solely with respect to the parties in the controversy.
CONST. art. 105.
131. CONST. art. 105, para. I; see Arteaga Nava, supra note 113, at 71-100 (pro-
viding a detailed legal and political analysis of the changes to this article). For the
complete text of Article 105, see APPENDIX ONE.
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a new social pact which, in the face of the system's decay, is searching
for the initiation .. of a process of institutional renewal, through a
constitutional reform, leading towards a transformation promoting new
forms of interrelations (convivencia) and government."
When President Zedillo made modifications to the federal judicial pow-
er-to article 105 of the Constitution, in particular-he no doubt consid-
ered them political changes.
Since the detailed enumeration of constitutional controversies is a new
legal phenomenon, and procedurally so unexplored, in May 1995 a
brand new set of procedural regulations (Ley Reglamentaria),'" the
Federal Code of Civil Procedure (Cddigo Federal de Procedimientos
Civiles), was established to govern issues not specifically addressed by
these new regulations." Given the novelty of this reglamentary act,
the Supreme Court has not taken cognizance of any cases involving a
constitutional controversy.'
3 5
The reglamentary act provides the following answers to previously
unanswered questions:
1. The parties in a constitutional controversy are: a) the plaintiff
(Actor) who is the entity, power or organ initiating the controversy;
b) the defendant (Demandado) who is the entity, power or organ who
issued or promulgated the general norm, or performed the act object of
the controversy; c) "third interested parties" (Tercero o terceros
interesados), those entities, powers or organs referred to in paragraph I
of article 105 of the Constitution who, "without being the plaintiffs or
the defendants, may be affected by the decision to be rendered;" and
d) the Attorney General of the Republic."
2. The President of Mexico may be represented legally by the Secre-
tary of State (Secretario de Estado, or cabinet member); the Head of the
Administrative Department, or the Government's Legal Counselor
(Consejero Juridico del Gobierno), as determined by the President him-
self, in conformity with the Organic Act of the Federal Public Adminis-
tration (Ley Orgdnica de la Administraci6n Pdblica Federao.'"
132. Maria Teresa G6mez Mont, La Reforma de Justicia y sus Implicaciones
Politicas, in REFORMAS, supra note 41, at 170.
133. Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 96.
134. Id. art. 1. The Federal Code of Civil Procedure (C.P.C. each state) was pub-
lished in D.O., Feb. 24, 1942, and was amended as recently as 1988.
135. Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 96, art. 10.
136. Id. art. 10.
137. Id. art. 11. For the text of Ley Orgdnica de la Administraci6n Plblica Fed-
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3. The initial complaint (Demanda) should contain: a) the plaintiff's
entity, power or organ, and the name and position of the public official
legally representing it; b) the defendant's entity, power or organ, and the
domicile; c) the interested third parties, entities, powers or organs, if
any, and their domiciles; d) the general norm, or act, whose invalidity is
demanded, as well as the official daily in which it was published, if
any; e) any and all constitutional articles deemed to have been violated;
f) a description of the facts or abstentions witnessed by the plaintiff and
constituting the antecedents of the general norm or act whose invalida-
tion is demanded; and g) the legal rationales for demanding the invalidi-
ty (Conceptos de invalidez),
4. Once the initial complaint is formally received, the President/Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court of Justice (Presidente de la Suprema
Corte) designates a Justice (Ministro instructor) to initiate the judicial
processing of the case (Poner el proceso en estado de resoluci6n),39
This Justice determines whether based on its merits, the complaint
should be admitted."4 If the complaint is admitted, the designated Jus-
tice must serve notice to the defendant, who has thirty days to an-
swer.
4 1
5. Once the defendant answers the complaint, the plaintiff has an
additional fifteen days to amend its complaint. 41 The designated Jus-
tice may order the parties to explain any obscure or irregular portions of
their respective motions. If the case appears to be especially sensitive or
important, the Justice may notify the Attorney General of the Repub-
lic. 43
eral, see D.O., Dec. 19, 1976, as amended, in D.O. Dec. 28, 1994. Until now, con-
stitutional controversies involving the federal government have been non-existent. Be-
cause of the changes made to the first paragraph of article 105 of the Constitution,
this situation is likely to change. Among other considerations, Mexico will have to
decide whether to create an office similar to that of the United States Office of the
Solicitor General, or to restructure its office of the Attorney General of the Republic
(Procurador General de la Republica). In the past, the Attorney General, in his ca-
pacity as "Abogado de la Nacion," has been directly involved in these matters. Mexi-
co may want to become familiar with the origin and evolution of certain legal strate-
gies utilized in cases before the United States Supreme Court, in particular, confes-
sions of error and amicus curiae briefs. See WASBY, supra note 82, at 139, 145-48.
138. Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 96, art. 22.
139. Id. arts. 24-26.
140. Id. arts. 24-26.
141. Id. arts. 24-26.
142. Id. arts. 27-28.
143. Id. arts. 27-28.
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6. Once the period for answering the initial complaint has elapsed,
the Justice in charge of the case sets a date for the evidence hearing
(Audiencia de ofrecimiento y desahogo de pruebas), which must take
place within the following thirty days.'"
7. In case of a default, the Court is to "presume that the facts alleged
in the motion are true (ciertos)," provided these facts "are directly attrib-
uted" to the parties in the case, except when there is evidence to the
contrary.t4
8. The parties are allowed to submit all types of evidence, except
those excluded by the law." The Justice in question has the power to
exclude any evidence that, in the Justice's opinion, "does not have a
relation with the controversy or has no influence in the final decision
(No guarden relaci6n con la controversia o no influyan en la sentencia
definitiva).' 147
9. Once the evidence hearing is concluded, pursuant to the Organic
Act of the Federal Judicial Power, the designated Justice submits the
pertinent draft resolution (Proyecto de resoluci6n) to the full Court
(Tribunal Pleno).'"
10. In conformity with Mexico's legal system on Amparo matters, the
Supreme Court is to "correct the mistakes in the citation of [legal] pre-
cepts" and, in particular, supplement any deficiencies to be found in the
initial complaint, the answer, the concluding remarks (Alegatos) or the
statement of the injurious consequences suffered (Agravios)."t In
Amparo proceedings, this initiative, undertaken ex officio by federal
courts, to supplement and even correct defective or incomplete motions
filed by the parties, is known as "Suplencia de la Queja."'
11. When controversies relate to general provisions of the States or of
municipalities, contested by the Federation; or of municipalities contested
144. Id. art. 29. The designated Justice may extend this term, at the Justice's
discretion, given the importance or implications (Importancia y trascendencia) of the
case.
145. Id. art. 30.
146. Id. art 31.
147. Id. art. 31.
148. Id. art. 36. "The resolutions of the Pleno of the Supreme Court of Justice
shall be taken by unanimity or majority of votes, save the cases provided in Section
I, penultimate paragraph, and Section II, of Article 105 of the Constitution, when a
majority of eight votes of the justices who are present shall be required." LO.PJ.F.
art. 7.
149. Ley Reglamentaria, supra note 96, arts. 39-40.
150. Id. arts. 39-40.
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by the States; or in cases referred to in paragraphs c, h, and k of Sec-
tion I of article 105 of the Constitution, and the resolution of the Su-
preme Court of Justice declares them invalid (Invdlidas), "said resolution
shall have general effects when approved by a majority of at least eight
votes."'' However, when this vote is not obtained, "the Pleno of the
Supreme Court of Justice shall declare said controversies dismissed
(Desestimadas) . . . . In all of the other cases, the resolutions shall have
effects solely with respect to the parties in the controversy."''
12. When the Supreme Court declares a general norm invalid, the
President of the Court shall order its publication in the Official Daily of
the Federation (Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n), and in the official
publication where said norm appeared.'53
13. Supreme Court decisions shall become legally effective following
the date as determined by the Court. The declaration of invalidity
(Declaraci6n de invalidez) shall have no retroactive effect, except in
penal matters, where general principles and the applicable legal provi-
sions shall control.
54
To observers of the evolution of Mexico's legal system, especially to
Mexican judges and legal practitioners, the Supreme Court's power to
make declarations of invalidity with "general effects" to be valid erga
omnes (globally), indeed constitutes a most unprecedented development
in Mexico's constitutional history. This may be yet another step towards
conforming the highest court to its original model. Predicting how the
new Mexican Supreme Court will weigh and decide these constitutional
controversies presents great difficulty. The constitutional requisite of ob-
taining "a majority of at least eight votes," out of a total of elev-
en-accurately characterized as a "qualified supermajority (seventy-three
percent)".--may become an insurmountable obstacle.'55
Ell. THE COUNCIL OF FEDERAL JUDICIARY
Since its creation in 1824, the most persistent problem of the Su-
preme Court of Mexico has been case backload (Rezago). Because of
the numerous amount and complexity of cases, the Court cannot make
decisions in an efficient and expeditious manner. The relative slowness
151. Id. art. 42.
152. Id. art. 42.
153. Id. art. 44.
154. Id. art. 45.
155. CONST. art. 17.
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with which the Supreme Court decides its cases appears to conflict with
one of Mexico's "individual rights," enshrined in article 17 of the Con-
stitution, that every person has a right to prompt resolution of con-
flicts.'5 6 As in the United States, the Rezago in Mexico can be attribut-
ed to two causes. First, ordinary cases manage to reach the Supreme
Court with relative ease. Second, since the establishment of this Court,
Justices must deal with certain administrative tasks that demand their
very personal attention and tend to distract them from their truly judicial
decision-making duties.
Imitating the United States, in 1951 Mexico decided to create Circuit
Collegiate Courts as federal appellate organs. The Circuit courts would
relieve the Supreme Court of Justice of its large docket, as a substantial
part of the docket was transferred to the lower Circuit courts." Ac-
cording to Dr. Fix Zamudio, as soon as the first Collegiate Courts were
created, the Supreme Court of Justice transferred 27,000 Amparo suits to
them.' This change, however, was clearly insufficient. By 1960, the
new Rezago of the Supreme Court had reached over 8000 cases, most
of them involving Amparo quest.' 59 In his recent Iniciativa, President
Zedillo acknowledged that, "Thanks to the sustained effort of the Su-
preme Court ... by the end of this year [1994] the Rezago was almost
non-existent. '""6
Evidently, the creation of the Council of the Federal Judiciary was
designed to address the second cause of the Rezago. For some authors,
156. Id. art. 17 (emphasis added).
[Elvery person has the right to be imparted justice by courts which shall be
expeditious for imparting it in the terms and conditions provided by the laws,
rendering their resolutions in a prompt, complete and impartial manner. Their
service shall be gratuitous, so judicial costs are, as a consequence, prohibited.
The federal and local laws shall establish the means necessary to guarantee the
independence of the courts and the full enforcement of their resolutions.
Id.
157. See Fix Zamudio, supra note 16, at 649, 660-63, in D.O., Feb. 19, 1951
(discussing the creation of these circuit courts in Mexico (Tribunales Colegiados de
Circuito en Materia de Amparo), as part of the "Alemdln Reform"). Dr. Fix Zamudio
asserts that "[t]he creation of these ... courts, even though it was not expressly
said, was inspired by the judicial organization of the federal courts of the United
States in 1891, when the Circuit appellate courts were established precisely to assist
the federal Supreme Court with the large number of cases that impeded its proper
functioning." Id. at 663 (emphasis added).
158. Id. at 664.
159. Id. at 665.
160. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 8.
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"the creation of this specialized organ of government and administration,
given the dimensions and complexity the Federal Judicial Power had
assumed, was urgent.''. Others felt the need for this type of organ
since early 1917, when Mexico decided to eliminate its Secretariat of
Justice (Secretaria de Justicia)62 Most specialists associated with the
Federal Judicial Power in Mexico approved of the creation of this new
organ.'63 In this regard, President Zedillo asserted:
[The initiative proposes that the administrative attributions [of the Su-
preme Court of Justice] be assigned to a newly created organ. This organ
is to be composed by persons designated by the three Powers of the
Union. [They] are to exercise their functions for a limited period of time
and would be substituted through a staggered terms system. With the
freeing of its administrative workloads, the Plenary of the Supreme Court
shall have more time to discharge its jurisdictional functions from now
on. This administrative organ shall be responsible for guarding the inde-
pendence of judges and magistrates, and shall take care that the judicial
career principles be strictly applied at all times, in order to guarantee an
adequate evaluation of those persons who are to assume the jurisdictional
function."
The composition, functions and administrative structure of the Council
of the Federal Judiciary, created as a result of an amendment to article
100 of the Constitution, are presented in even greater detail in the Title
Six of the Organic Act of the Federal Judicial Power."
A. COMPOSITION
Article 100 of the Constitution provides that the Council shall consist
of seven members, known as counselors (Consejeros). One shall be the
President of the Supreme Court of Justice, who shall also preside over
the Council.'" The next three members shall include a magistrate of
the Circuit Collegiate Courts, a magistrate of the Unitary Circuit Courts,
161. Reformas y Adiciones, supra note 42, at 5.
162. This Secretariat was derogated by the article 14 Transitory, of the Presidential
decree promulgating the then recently formulated Federal Constitution of 1917. See
D.O., Feb. 5, 1917; see also Omar Guerrero Orozco, La Secretaria de Justicia,
Eslabrn Perdido de la Administraci6n Pilblica Mexicana?, in REFORMAS, supra note
41, at 149-65.
163. REFORMAs, supra note 41, at 11, 21, 27.
164. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 6.
165. L.O.PJ.F. arts. 68-128.
166. Id.
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and a district judge, who is elected by a lottery system
(Insaculaci6n). The Council will also include two counselors, one of
which is designated by the Senate and one by the President of the Re-
public."6 The designated members shall be persons who "have distin-
guished themselves because of their capability, honesty and honorability
in the exercise of their legal activities."'69 Counselors must meet the
same requirements as Supreme Court Justices."
Except for the President of the Council, the remaining counselors will
serve five years in their position. Their appointments shall occur in a
staggered manner, and they may not be appointed for a new term. The
Counselors are to exercise their duties "with independence and impartial-
ity" and during their tenure, may "only be removed under the terms of
Title Four of this Constitution.""' The President of the Council is em-
powered to have legal representation, initiate matters that correspond to
the Plenary, distribute cases among the other members, preside over the
sessions, lead debates and oversee the function of subordinate organs,
inform the Senate of any vacancies at the Council, grant licenses, sign
the resolutions (resoluciones) and agreements (acuerdos), and so
forth
m2
B. FUNCTIONS
According to the Constitution, "the administration, vigilance and disci-
pline of the Federal Judicial Power, with exception of the Supreme
Court of Justice of the Nation, shall be carried out by the Council of
the Federal Judiciary, in the terms established by the laws and in con-
formity with the bases provided by this Constitution."" The Council
functions in Plenary (Pleno) or through the work of Commissions. Every
year, it shall conduct two sessions: the first, from January until mid-
167. Id.
168. Id.
169. CONST. art. 100; L.O.P.J.F. art. 69.
170. CONST. art. 95 (enumerating these requirements).
171. Id. Title Four, articles 108 through 114, of the Constitution refers to The
Responsibilities of Public Servants. This legal responsibility is the same as the one
that applies to Supreme Court justices. See id. art. 110 (identifying officials of the
Federal Judiciary subject to impeachment); supra note 102 and accompanying text
(discussing article 110).
172. L.O.P.J.F. art. 85, paras. I-X.
173. CONsT. art. 100; L.O.P.J.F. art. 68.
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July; and, the second, from August until mid-December.174 The
Council's Plenary is formed by seven counselors, but the presence of
five is sufficient to be in session. Generally, the Plenary's "ordinary
sessions" are private.'"
The Council's Commissions may be permanent or temporal, and its
composition may vary as determined by the Council's Plenary.' Each
Commission shall consist of three members: the Judicial Power shall
supply one, and the Executive and the Senate shall designate the other
two." If a Commission fails to reach a resolution, the matter shall be
transferred to the Council's Plenary.7 1 Pursuant to the Organic Act,
the Council is to have the following five commissions: 1) Administra-
tion, 2) Judicial career, 3) Discipline, 4) Creation of new organs, and
5) Description. 79
The Council's principal functions, designated as "Attributions"
(Atribuciones) in the Organic Act, include:
1) to determine the number and the territorial boundaries of the Circuits
into which the territory of Mexico is divided;
2) to determine the number and the "specialization" by subject matter of
the Collegiate and Unitary courts in each Circuit;
3) to determine the number, territorial boundaries, and specialization, etc.,
of District courts;
4) to appoint the Circuit magistrates and District judges, and to resolve
on their ratification, adscription and removal;
5) to decide on the resignations submitted by Circuit magistrates and
District judges;
6) to decide on the "forced retirement" (Retiro forzoso) of magistrates and
judges;
7) to suspend magistrates and judges;
8) to resolve on administrative complaints (Quejas administrativas) and on
the legal responsibility of public servants in the judiciary;
9) to approve the annual spending budget of the Federal Judicial Power to
be sent to the President of the Supreme Court;
10) to formulate the guidelines (Bases) so "the acquisitions, leasings and
transfers of real estate, rendering of services on any nature and construc-
tion contracting ... are in conformity with Art. 134 of the Constitution."
174. L.O.PJ.F. arts. 74-76.
175. Id.
176. Id. arts. 77-80.
177. Id.
178. Id.
179. Id. art. 77.
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11) to establish the criteria for the modernization of the court's infrastruc-
ture;
12) to resolve certain labor conflicts;
13) to periodically convoke national or regional conferences for the bene-
fit of the judiciary,
14) to administer the movable and immovable assets of the Federal Judi-
cial Power, and
15) to formulate a listing of the persons who may render professional
legal services as "Experts" (Peritos) before the organs of this Power,
etc.
19
The Organic Act further specifies that decisions by the Council "shall be
made by the vote of the majority of the Counselors present," and relate
only to certain explicitly enunciated matters.'
C. THE INsTITuTE OF THE JUDICIARY
During the last decade, the organs of the Federal Judicial Power have
grown tremendously." In every year since the 1980s, an average of
twenty-one federal courts have been created." This increase has posed
a serious problem for the administration of justice, as well as for the
training and professional specialization of magistrates and judges. This
problem has resulted in delayed and unfair justice, and a growing im-
provisation on behalf of judges.' On this delicate question, President
Zedillo stated that:
In order to elevate in the future, the professional quality of those who
will have to impart justice, this reform aspires to raise to a constitutional
rank the judicial career, so in the future the appointment, adscription and
removal of judges and magistrates will be subject to general, objective
and impartial criteria to be determined by the laws on this matter.'
To accomplish this goal, the Institute of the Judiciary, an auxiliary
organ of the Council, is in charge of the "research, development, train-
ing and updating of the members of the Federal Judicial Power, and of
those who aspire to belong to it."' The Institute may have regional
180. Id. art. 81, passim. This article lists 41 specific functions.
181. Id. arts. 76, 81 (listing these specific matters).
182. Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 18.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. L.O.PJ.F. art. 92. The functions and powers of this Institute are to be con-
trolled by "the norms to be detennined by the Federal Council of the Judiciary in the
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offices (extensiones regionales), support programs and courses to benefit
local judicial powers, and enter into arrangements with Mexican univer-
sities to assist in the implementation of these activities.'87
This Institute has the support of an Academic Committee (Comitd
Acadgmico)"8 This Institute is expected to implement "programs and
courses" designed:
1) To develop a practical knowledge regarding the procedures and matters
under the jurisdiction of the Council of the Federal Judiciary; 2) To per-
fect certain technical skills; 3) To strengthen and specialize in matters
dealing with the applicable law, doctrine and jurisprudence
(Jurisprudencia); 4) To perfect techniques on legal analysis, interpretation
and argumentation; 5) To teach administrative techniques relating to the
jurisdictional function; 6) To develop legal vocations in favor of a judicial
career, and the ethical values associated with it; and, 7) To promote aca-
demic exchanges with institutes of higher education. 89
The need to elevate the legal preparation and training of judges and
magistrates, including a strong and indispensable ethical component, is
also found in the legal education system. From an academic viewpoint,
the legal education system must be modernized and substantially revised.
The system must be brought up to date with the latest developments in
selected legal areas which affect the country on domestic and interna-
tional levels, with the recent scientific and technological accom-
plishments, and must be reoriented and developed on a sounder and
more efficient financial base.
A profound curricular reform must be accompanied with the establish-
ment of academic and clinical cadres devoted to teaching on a full- time
basis. Such a reform should include the introduction of clinical programs
emphasizing: drafting of legal documents, legal research and oral advo-
cacy, special seminars addressing domestic and international legal areas
close to Mexico's national priorities, modern legal libraries, and a gradu-
al emergence and diversification of more modem and varied teaching
textbooks-including complementary didactic materials and electronic
data banks.
Law schools and other academic institutions in Mexico, including the
Institute of the Judiciary, may want to gather information and evaluate
some of the academic, clinical and training programs available to law
respective regulations." Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. art. 94.
189. Id. art. 95.
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students, judges, professors, judicial administrators, and governmental
legal officials, currently offered by United States law schools and other
training institutions. A revision of this nature may lead to profound
changes in the legal profession. Such changes may include unprecedent-
ed notions such as the introduction of a bar exam,"g a new role of a
bar association, 9' and the function of public notaries." In recent
years, the number of cases on international civil litigation between Mex-
ico and the United States has increased significantly, principally as a re-
sult of NAFA 93 and the modernization of Mexico's rules on foreign
investment, conflict of laws, and other legal areas.'" Members of
190. There has never been a bar exam in Mexico. After the student receives a
law degree from an accredited law school, the Secretariat of Public Education (SEP),
through its General Directorate of Professions, extends the law graduate a "Cedula
Profesional." This cidula is a type of federal permit or patent which authorizes the
beneficiary to render professional services as an attorney at law (Licenciado en
Derecho) anywhere in Mexico. However, the academic quality of most law graduates
has been decreasing considerably over the last decades. This has prompted the idea
that some type of examination should be introduced in Mexico to test the academic
and professional competency of law graduates prior to practicing as an attorney.
191. In Mexico, bar associations (Barras y Colegios de Abogados) are quite differ-
ent from their counterparts in the United States. Barras y Colegios are voluntary
professional associations of attorneys. Their activities principally consist in organizing
lectures, conferences and symposia for the benefit of their members, similar to the
Continuing Legal Education (CLE) programs in this country. Recently, some ideas
have been advanced to change the nature and professional scope of the Barras y
Colegios, in order to transform them into obligatory associations designed, for exam-
ple, to monitor the professional competency and even the ethical standards of its
members.
192. Public notaries (Notarios pilblicos) play a crucial role in most civil, corporate
and fiscal areas of Mexico's legal system. They not only serve as legal counselors to
Mexican attorneys but also act on behalf of the government to verify compliance with
certain legal provisions in tax, real estate and immigration law questions. Endowed
with the power of public faith (Fd Pdblica), the professional involvement of public
notaries is legally indispensable for the conduct of certain business transactions. These
vast powers have given public notaries a most privileged position in Mexico. Over
the last decade, the federal government has adopted a number of measures directed at
opening a large legal arena which has been almost exclusively controlled by public
notaries since its inception. This is being done by enlarging the scope of the func-
tions performed by public brokers (Corredores pZblicos) in the commercial legal are-
na. In certain areas, the legal powers of Corredores closely parallel those of the
Notarios. This slow and gradual change attempts to democratize the work and au-
thority of "Fedatarios piblicos," performed in Mexico by both Notarios and
Corredores.
193. North American Free Trade Agreement, Can.-Mex.-U.S., Dec. 17, 1992, 32
LL.M. 605 (1993).
194. See generally Jorge A. Vargas, Conflict of Laws in Mexico: The New Rules
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Mexico's Federal Judicial Power, including the Supreme Court of Jus-
tice, are interested in learning about specific aspects of the United States
legal system. Therefore, certain American law schools appear to be sin-
gularly qualified to expand and complement the professional and aca-
demic legal training of Mexican magistrates and judges in specific areas
of United States law, especially those directly related to their judicial
work.
A solid legal and professional formation is indispensable to guarantee
a competent, efficient and honest judicial system of justice. Mexico has
desperately needed this kind of system for decades. Most recently, Presi-
dent Zedillo, in his National Development Program, 1995-2000, clearly
identified this problem.'95 The special emphasis Zedillo is placing upon
the federal judiciary, the establishment of a national security system, and
the professionalization of both judges and police forces, has led legal
specialists to suggest that these changes are only the beginning."
They are convinced that the sanitization, modernization and
professionalization of the system of justice in Mexico will be attempted
before the end of the century. The complete elimination of the pervasive
corruption that has long prevailed in governmental circles at all levels,
including judges and magistrates-especially those in the criminal
field-is the unanimous clamor of the Mexican people. Today, this
clamor has become Mexico's national imperative."9
Introduced by the 1988 Amendments, 28 INT'L L. 659 (1994) (discussing "international
procedural law" as it relates to international civil litigation between Mexico and the
United States); Jorge A. Vargas, Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Mexico: The
1988 Rules of the Federal Code of Civil Procedure, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 376
(1994) (discussing Mexico's adoption of codificatory instruments at the international
level to regulate conflict of laws questions).
195. See Por un Estado de Derecho y un Pais de Leyes, President Zedillo's Plan,
Section 2, in D.O., May 31, 1995, at 17-28 (presenting a platform for President
Zedillo). "National Development Plans" are made public by each Mexican President at
the beginning of his six-year term. Politically, they may be considered as a "presiden-
tial platform" or as the personal political program of the Federal Executive. During
his administration, the President is publicly committed to implement the programs for
the benefit of the Mexican people.
196. See REFORMAS, supra note 41, passim (illustrating the opinions of Mario
Melgar Adalid, Juan de Dios Castro Lozano, Mtximo Carvajal Contreras, Arnaldo
C6rdova, Maria Teresa G6mez Mont, Alonso Lujambio Irazabal).
197. Id.
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Mexican experts' assert that the tragic deaths of the PRI Presiden-
tial candidate Luis Donaldo Colosio,'" Cardinal Juan Manuel
Posadas, ° and the PRI politician Josd Francisco Ruiz Massieu ' in
the past two years have mainly served to heighten Mexico's attention to
the deep and pervasive problems that have chronically existed in that
system. Although these shocking assassinations took Mexico by surprise,
a fair and professional system of justice is considered to be in place and
to operate effectively not when it applies to the powerful, the wealthy
and the famous, but when it applies the law and renders justice to the
millions of ordinary Mexicans, and in particular to the poor, the igno-
rant and the weak, including the indigenous peoples of that country.
The current attempts of the Mexican government to extradite Mario
Ruiz Massieu,' 3 a former Deputy Attorney General, to file criminal
charges concurrently against the brother of a former Mexican President
for his alleged involvement in the assassination of Jos6 Francisco Ruiz
Massieu, and to investigate the President of the Superior Court of
the Federal District (Presidente del Tribunal Superior de Justicia del
Distrito Federal) for his possible implication in the death of a Mexico
City Superior Court magistrate, illustrate the monumental challenge
198. See Arnaldo C6rdova, Perspectivas de la Nueva Justicia, in REFORntAS, supra
note 41, at 129, 134-37.
199. See Todd Robberson, Judge Frees 2 Suspects In Colosio Assassination; Mexi-
can Efforts to Clear Up Cases Stymied, WASH. PoST, July 9, 1995, at A21 (discuss-
ing the different theories surrounding the investigation of the Colosio assassination).
200. See Todd Robberson, Ex-Prosecutor Assassinated in Guadalajara; Victim Had
Headed Probe in '93 Slaying of Cardinal, WASH. POST, May 11, 1995, at A31 (sug-
gesting that there is a high probability that Posada's death was deliberate rather than
an accidental shooting pursuant to cross-fire).
201. Juanita Darling, Killer of No. 2 PRI Official Gets 50-Year Term in Mexico,
L.A. TiNES, Mar. 22, 1995, at Al (reporting on the convictions of the men who
murdered Francisco Ruiz Massieu).
202. See Jorge A. Vargas, NAFTA, the Chiapas Rebellion and the Emergence of
Mexican Ethnic Law, 25 CAL V. INT'L LJ. 1, 43-52 (1994) (discussing Mexican
legal policies toward indigenous peoples).
203. See Robert L. Jackson & Juanita Darling, U.S. Judge Won't Extradite Former
Mexico Official, LA. TIMEs, June 23, 1995, at Al (reporting that a United States
magistrate has refused to extradite former Attorney General Mario Ruiz Massieu).
204. See Tim Golden, Ruling on Mexico Case: Score One for Salinas Inc.. N.Y.
Tamrs, June 24, 1995, A5 (indicating that both Massieu and Salinas have been impli-
cated in the assassination).
205. See Diego Cevallos, Mexico: Murder of New Judge Brings New Political
Upheavel, June 21, 1995, Inter Press Service, 1995 WL 2261896 (discussing the mur-
der of Superior Court Magistrate Abraham Polo Uscanga and the ensuing investiga-
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President Zedillo faces to transform radically the justice system in his
country.
D. THE COUNCIL OF THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY:
A EUROPEAN NOTION TRANSPLANTED TO MEXICO
As part of the Western legal tradition, one may recognize two sepa-
rate systems created to guarantee the independence and impartiality of
the judges and the courts. One, the judicial system developed by the
common law tradition, consists of features created by the United States
which place this responsibility upon the shoulders of the courts them-
selves, ordinarily those ranked at the highest level. The other, a civil
code system, leaves the vigilance of the judge's independence and im-
partiality in a special organ, usually the executive power, and traditional-
ly known as the Ministry of Justice.2" This system has flourished in
continental Europe, a bastion of the civil legal tradition, especially dur-
ing the last century.
After the Second World War, several European countries initiated a
trend by creating the so-called "Superior Councils of the Magistrature"
or "Superior Councils of the Judiciary." These new organs reduced the
powers traditionally given to Ministries of Justice, and shifted to the
court system functions considered to be eminently administrative and
not judicial per se. Dr. Fix Zamudio suggests that "the self-government
of the magistrature" (autogobierno de la magistratura)"°7 adequately
describes this trend.
tion).
206. See HtCTOR Fix ZAMuDIO, MEMORIA DEL COLEGIo NACIONAL SEPARATAS
43-75 (1992) (reviewing these special organs in Europe and Latin America).
207. Id. at 44.
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In recent years, France,"8  Italy,2"' Portugal, 210  Turkey2"
Greece, 12 and Spain213 have undertaken special administrative efforts
in this direction. The emergence of these new organs produced a prompt
and similar reaction in Latin America, where several countries enacted
legislation to create similar entities. According to the composition and
functions of these new organs, Dr. Fix Zamudio divided this legislation
into three phases: 1) the introduction of this trend to South America,
initiated by Colombia (1955), Venezuela (1961), Pera (1969), Brazil
(1979), and Uruguay (1981); 2) a restructuring of the trend, taking place
in Perd (1969, as amended in 1979 and 1993), El Salvador (1983), and
Panamd (1987); and 3) the latest trend, currently represented by Costa
Rica (1989), Colombia (1991), Paraguay (1992), Bolivia (1994), Argenti-
na (1994), and now Mexico (1995).214
Mexican scholars are of the general opinion that, although these
South American trends exercised some degree of influence in Mexico,
the recent creation of its Council of the Federal Judiciary was princi-
pally patterned after Spain's General Council of the Judicial Power
(Consejo General del Poder Judicia).2 s Given the limited scope of
this article, no attempt shall be made to conduct a comparative analysis
between these two corresponding organs in Spain and Mexico. Suffice it
208. CONST. arts. 83-84 (1946) (France) (creating the Superior Council of the
Magistrature); see also CONST. art. 65 (1958) (France) (corresponding to Regulations
of Dec. 22, 1958, modified on Feb. 5, 1994) (expanding the content of the articles
by special legislation of Feb. 1 and 22, 1947).
209. COST. [Constitution] arts. 104-105 (Italy) (creating Italy's Carta Republicana
and the Superior Court of the Magistrature); see also regulations of Mar. 24, 1958,
1975, and 1981.
210. CONST. art. 223 (1976) (Portugal) (creating a similar organ with the same de-
nomination). Two special regulations have been enacted: a) the Statute of Judicial
Magistrates of Dec. 31, 1976; and b) the Law 85-77 of Dec. 13, 1977, arts. 139-86.
211. CONST. arts. 143-44 (1961) (Turkey) (creating an organ with the same de-
nomination).
212. CONST. (1975) (Greece) (creating the "Supreme Council of the Judiciary").
213. C.E. [Constitucion] (1978) (Spain) (creating Spain's General Council of the
Judicial Power, which is currently governed by the Organic Act of the Judicial Power
(Ley Orgdnica del Poder Judicial) of July 1985).
214. See Fix ZAmDIO, supra note 202, at 51-69 (detailing the several phases of
this new type of legislation).
215. See Mario Melgar Adalid, El Consejo de la Judicatura Federal y la Divisidn
de Poderes, in REFORMAS, supra note 41, at 117; Jos6 Luis Soberanes Femdndz, El
Consejo de la Judicatura Federal a la Luz del Derecho Comparado, in REFOR,tAS.
supra note 41, at 213.
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to say that the legal literature in Mexico at this point is directed at
addressing the following intriguing questions:
1) What is the legal nature of Mexico's Council? Does it belong to the
Judicial Power or to the Executive? The general impression is that the
Council of the Federal Judiciary forms a part of the Judicial Power, al-
though it results from a concurrent exercise of these two powers; 6 and
2) How is this Council of the Federal Judiciary, considering its direct
European legal roots, going to function in a country such as Mexico?
Again, only time will tell.
Due to the increasing volume of administrative work that is generated
within Mexico's federal judicial system every year, the number of coun-
selors-now limited to only seven-is clearly insufficient.2"7 The ap-
pointment of counselors who come from the judicial ranks should be
improved. The current system (Insaculaci6n) guarantees impartiality, but
not professional capability, in the exercise of these new and delicate
tasks."'
In Mexico, as a rule, jurists or politicians tend to introduce legal
innovations at a federal level, usually at Mexico City. The Council of
the Judiciary, however, constitutes the exception to the rule. The north-
ern states of Sinaloa2"9 and Coahuila' introduced this Council at the
state level in 1990 by an amendment to their respective local judicial
statutes. These states instituted this action years before President Zedillo
submitted his initiative to the Federal Congress.
IV. THE IMPACT OF THE SUPREME COURT OF
JUSTICE UPON MEXICO'S SOCIETY
From functional and structural viewpoints, undeniable similarities exist
between Mexico's Supreme Court of Justice and the United States coun-
terpart. These similarities, however, may be more cosmetic than real.
Throughout its history, especially since the early years of the Marshall
Court, the Supreme Court of the United States has held a unique power:
216. See Mario Melgar Adalid, El Consejo de la Judicatura Federal y la Division
de Poderes, in REFORMAS, supra note 41, at 117, 120.
217. Reformas y Adiciones, supra note 42, at 6.
218. Id. at 6.
219. See SINALOA CONST. arts. 94, 97 (as amended in 1988 and 1990); see also
Organic Act of the Judicial Power of the State of Sinaloa, D.O., Apr. 10, 1995, arts.
79-80.
220. See Organic Act of the Judicial Power of the State of Coahuila, in D.O.,
Dec. 11, 1990.
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the power to touch, transform and direct the most fundamental aspects
of American life. At some point in time, decisions of the United States
Supreme Court significantly affect virtually all people or entities."'
The United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction over the following
areas: inter-governmental relations, the economy, free speech, criminal
rights, racial questions, civil liberties, religion, constitutional rights and
due process, reproductive questions, ethnic minorities, science and tech-
nology issues, civil rights, war powers and international affairs. The
Court not only renders judicial decisions, but, more importantly, formu-
lates decisions that quickly become public policies for the entire nation.
Judgments may dictate the flow of activities and movement of the coun-
try, as well as the color and shade of its societal values.
Once the decision-making reaches a level that incorporates public
policy, however, all similarities between these two courts come to an
end. Decisions of the Supreme Court of Mexico have not touched an
infinite number of areas. In a manner of speaking, Mexico's Supreme
Court is today, and has been for a long time, the highest judicial organ
whose decisions may affect entrepreneurs and attorneys, for example, but
not the Mexican people as a whole, or Mexico as a nation.
Unlike the Supreme Court of the United States, Mexicans do not
perceive the Supreme Court of Mexico as a judicial institution having
the power to influence social, political, and economic forces. Mexico has
never had a decision like Marbury v. Madison. Yesterday, and even
today, citizens question the political status of the weakest of the three
official branches, the Supreme Court of Justice, as a real "power."
The rebirth of the Supreme Court of Justice of Mexico is a construc-
tive development that is the beginning of a profound reform and mod-
ernization of the system of justice. Therefore, in its new role as a truly
constitutional court, the question arises as to whether the Supreme Court
may start to produce decisions with far reaching implications, from
social, political and economic perspectives, designed to foster the recent
trend favoring modernization and progress; in other words, a Supreme
Court which operates independently from the Federal Executive.
No one questions that the Supreme Court will have a vital, and clear-
ly pivotal role in turning Mexico into a "Law and Order" country
221. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have a
right to privacy in determining whether to end a pregnancy); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S.
186 (1962) (holding that the Court must give deference to the Executive Branch when
dealing with political questions); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
(holding that in racial segregation, separate is inherently unequal).
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(Estado de Derecho). The new Supreme Court of Mexico has opened
the door into a completely new judicial era. Given the serious financial
crisis triggered at the initiation of President Zedillo's administration, the
new Court is likely to devote some of its time to resolving economic
questions, especially questions associated with the NAFTA. In a way,
these questions may be reminiscent of the issues the United States Su-
preme Court had to resolve in the period of 1865 to 1937.
Questions arise as to whether this new Court will move away from
economic issues and address other important issues concerning civil
liberties, freedom of expression, religion, and equal treatment of ethnic
minorities. Another tier of legal issues consists of more practical topics,
including the right of counsel, seizure practices, and the questioning of
suspects. Women's and children's rights, environmental questions, and
immigration law represent another set of legal priorities.
The newly created Supreme Court in Mexico may be politically and
legally placed in the same situation as the United States Supreme Court
at the very beginning of the Marshall Court. To a large extent, Justice
Marshall's wisdom and determination led to the creation of the Supreme
Court as it is known today. If Mexico's Supreme Court follows the
same historic path as did the United States Supreme Court, it may take
its most luminous step toward resurrection.
CONCLUSION
The review and analysis of the 1995 changes to the Supreme Court in
Mexico, made by President Zedillo through his first legislative initiative
to amend the Constitution, may lead to these conclusions, advanced
from their two most salient but contrasting perspectives: 1) from their
purely judicial nature; and 2) from their political dimension.
A. FROM THEIR PURELY JUDICIAL NATURE
This legal reform represents the latest attempt to convert the Supreme
Court of Mexico into a true constitutional court. Pursuant to its new
functions, this highest tribunal is vested with power to interpret and
enforce the Constitution as law. In other words, it has become the ulti-
mate interpreter and enforcer of the Mexican Constitution. The Zedillo
amendment moves beyond the prior, but limited, reform initiated by
President Miguel de la Madrid in the late 1980s, when decisions on
constitutional control questions were reserved to this high tribunal."n
222. See Ignacio Carrillo Prieto, Renovacion Constitucional y Sistema Politico, in
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Within this judicial context, at least three innovations have especially
attracted the attention of Mexican constitutional law experts who have
not yet ceased in commenting, nor in criticizing these changes.
1. Unconstitutionality Actions
This type of action is unanimously characterized as one of the most
important "constitutional innovations" introduced by the Zedillo reform.
Pursuant to this change, a qualified minority in legislative bodies at the
federal and state levels, have been given the right to challenge directly,
before the Plenary of the Supreme Court of Justice, the constitutionality
of a federal or state statute, or an international treaty. When the uncon-
stitutionality is declared by a majority of a least eight votes, the statute
or treaty in question is declared "invalid" and, as a result, the declara-
tion produces general legal effects throughout Mexico, as happens in the
United States today.
To underline the importance of this change it may be useful to point
out that since its inception, when the Writ of Amparo was created pur-
suant to the Constitutive Act of the Federation in 1824, the legal effects
of the final decision in this kind of federal suit have always been limit-
ed to protect only the aggrieved individual who filed the Amparo action.
This has been a most distinct feature in Amparo proceedings, known as
the "Otero Formulation" in Mexico's constitutional law doctrine. The
exclusion of electoral matters from the scope of these actions had been
advanced, rightly so, as the strongest criticism to this change. There is
no valid legal reason for the exclusion of this important and pivotal area
from the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction, especially now that Pres-
ident Zedillo's administration is intent on stimulating political reform in
his country. Accordingly, this constitutional change seems to be legally
short and politically incongruent.
2. The Council of the Federal Judiciary
From an administrative viewpoint, the creation of this new judicial
organ has been uniformly recognized as an adequate and necessary
development. To relieve Supreme Court Justices of their burdensome
and rather antiquated administrative duties regarding lower courts may
be the best change from a managerial standpoint. Abolishing these duties
REFOPAS 1982-1988, at 300-01 (S.A. Pomia ed., 1st ed. 1987) (providing the ratio-
nale and content of this amendment).
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represents a big plus when compared with the performance of those
demanding intellectual tasks Justices are to render during their tenure.
Comparatively, the suppression of these duties may be equated, to an
extent, with the elimination of circuit riding by United States Supreme
Court Justices early last century.
The creation of the Council of the Federal Judiciary may also be con-
strued as a response to those who favor specialization and efficiency as
essential components of the judicial sector. Mexican specialists seemed
to be pleased that it was the General Council of the Judicial Power of
Spain-a country whose legal influence in Mexico and throughout Latin
America is quite evident-that was utilized as the model for their
country's new judicial organ.
From a domestic angle, it was intriguing to learn that the Council of
the Judiciary had already been transplanted to Mexico, from Europe, in
1990. The northern states of Sinaloa and Coahuila share the merit of
having been the pioneers in introducing this addition to the Mexican
judicial system. It is to be expected that similar Councils will appear in
other Mexican states in the future. Studying the structure, composition
and functions of Councils of the Judiciary that currently exist in Europe,
one is led to consider whether they may offer any interesting or useful
insights into our United States Supreme Court, from administrative and
academic viewpoints.
3. An Overhaul of Mexico's System of Justice
The perception that currently prevails in the United States and else-
where, that Mexico has an antiquated, inefficient and corrupt system of
justice, has been an old and permanent fixture attached to that country's
legal edifice. The changes introduced to the federal judicial system by
President Zedillo's constitutional amendment signal the determination to
launch a radical transformation of the law enforcement bodies, and the
system of imparting justice in that nation. This amendment has been
identified by Mexican specialists as only the beginning. It is a first step
in a long and arduous journey that is expected to move forward in order
to bring transparency to secret chambers in judicial courts and to open
and clean up dark rooms in police and military departments throughout
the vast and varied geography of that country.
In his recent "National Development Plan, 1995-2000," President
Zedillo asserted that "a new phase of comprehensive renewal in favor of
a State of law and order, as demanded by the Mexican society, was
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initiated with the constitutional amendments of December of 19 9 4.'' m
In this Plan, the President of Mexico spells out in detail the objectives,
strategies and actions that have already been put in place to transform
his country into a nation that truly abides by its Constitution and re-
spects its laws (Por un Estado de Derecho y un Pais de Leyes)."4 The
training and professionalization of federal judges and magistrates, and
the establishment of the judicial career, are steps directed towards this
goal.
B. FROM THEIR POLITICAL DIMiENSION
These constitutional amendments go beyond their purely judicial na-
ture. They must be placed within a larger context: the political equilibri-
um that must exist in a federal government between the executive, legis-
lative and judicial powers. From this angle, one may construe these
changes as the first constitutional initiative in the political history of that
nation expressly drafted to provide its Supreme Court of Justice with a
new and more vigorous official profile. This constitutional transforma-
tion was designed to produce a "political rebirth" of Mexico's highest
tribunal.
Parallel to the political ideas advanced in the United States in the
early era of the Supreme Court, suggesting that the Judicial Power was
not a real power,' similar arguments were made in Mexico, most not-
edly by Emilio Rabasa early this century.' Considering the asymmet-
rical accumulation of political power gathered in the hands of the Feder-
al Executive vis-a-vis the other two powers-a political anomaly which
has resulted in a de facto Super-Presidency in Mexico-political and
223. See PLAN NACIONAL DE DESARROLLO, supra note 91, at 20.
224. See id. at 17-28.
225. THE FEDERALIST No. 18 (Alexander Hamilton); see ALEXANDER M. BICKEL.
THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPRmE COURT AT THE BAR PoLmcs
(1962).
226. See generally EMILuO RABASA, LA CONSTITUCION Y LA DICTADURA (1912).
Rabasa states:
The judicial department will never be a power because the administration of
justice is never dependant on the will of the nation; because in its resolutions
neither the desire nor the public good are taken into account, and the individual
right is superior to the common interest, since the courts do not resolve what
they want in the name of the people, but what they should and must do in the
name of the law; and because a free will, which is the essence of the organ
power, would be the degeneration and corruption of the organ of justice.
Id. at 256.
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legal observers may reasonably wonder whether a federal form of repub-
lican government exists in Mexico, as it is formally stated in its Consti-
tution."'
As a consequence of the recent electoral reform, the Federal Congress
is beginning to show some signs of political autonomy and indepen-
dence, as a branch separate and different from the Executive. In essence,
this has been accomplished by the political representation recently ac-
quired by members of political parties different than the official PRI as
federal representatives in the Chamber of Deputies (Cdmara de
Diputados). Legislators from the PAN and the PRD are beginning to
form coalitions in this Chamber to counterbalance the political control
the PRI has exercised for decades. Accordingly, the perception of a
stronger legislative power has begun to emerge over the last few years.
However, nothing similar has occurred in relation with the Federal Judi-
cial Power. Consequently, whereas the Legislative branch is already in
the process of gaining political strength, the Judicial Power remains
unchanged.
Therefore, in consonance with his stated policy of introducing a new
type of federalism, President Zedillo is also engaged in a determined
effort to balance the three federal powers, attempting to place them at
the same political level, at a plane of coordination, as mandated by the
Constitution. This delicate political exercise has resulted in the imple-
mentation of two coordinated strategies: first, in the lowering of the
asymmetrical political power of the federal executive. In this respect,
President Zedillo has coined the term "Presidencia acotada," (i.e., a
clearly delimited Presidency). This would mean that in Mexico today the
Presidency no longer has, nor does it confer, an absolute political pow-
er. Rather, the Presidency now has clearly defined political boundaries.
Second, the changes have elevated the political standing of the Supreme
Court of Justice to the epitome of the federal judicial power. This latter
strategy played a pivotal part in President Zedillo's decision to amend
the composition and functions of this highest tribunal. Through the
amendment, he intended to enhance the political status and legal role of
that court.2" Now that the amendments have been enacted, the next
227. See CONST. art. 49.
228. See Iniciativa, supra note 3, at 3. This intention becomes evident from the
text of President Zedillo's legislative initiative:
[A] Supreme Court of Justice [that is] free, autonomous, strengthened and of
excellence, is essential for the full validity of the Constitution, and for the
State of law and order that said Constitution consecrates. The popular will has
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question is whether they will accomplish this goal and, in reality,
change the course of the Supreme Court.
deposited in the Supreme Court the fundamental function of maintaining the
balance between the Powers of the Union, resolving the controversies that may
arise between the Executive and the Legislative. Furthermore, in the Supreme
Court resides the mandate of protecting the union of the Republic, resolving the
controversies between States, municipalities, the Federal District and the Federa-
tion. In the Supreme Court resides, also, the mandate to guarantee individuals
that any act of the authority complies strictly to the order established by the
Constitution. Consequently, a rigime of full respect to a State of law and or-
der, and to a just and efficient system of imparting justice and public security,
requires a Judicial Power more independent and more powerful.
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